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Like the ICJ, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ("ITLOS") has no formal regime for amicus curiae participation in its Tribunal or Seabed Disputes Chamber. Participation of non-disputing parties is limited to specified situations. In contentious proceedings, the Tribunal or Chamber may request or permit "intergovernmental organizations" to furnish information relevant to cases before them orally or in writing under Article 84 of the ITLOS Rules. In advisory proceedings, under Article 133 of the ITLOS Rules, the Chamber will receive written and oral statements from states parties and those intergovernmental organizations which are notified of the case. 10 In the single instance where entities (two NGOs) requested leave to participate as amici curiae, the request was rejected. 11 While there has been some informal participation of non-disputing entities in disputes before the Tribunal, 12 ITLOS mirrors the ICJ by dealing with amici curiae restrictively. 13 The World Trade Organization ("WTO") dispute settlement system is a forum in which the participation of amici curiae is arguably "the most sensitive issue among the membership related to issues regarding participation of non-Members".
14 On the one hand, the Appellate Body has repeatedly affirmed that both it and Panels have authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions. 15 However, on the other hand, WTO Members have been, with few exceptions, 16 critical of this position, arguing that there is no place for non-member amicus curiae participation. 17 Although this conflict of views arose more than a decade ago after the US -Shrimp case, the passage of time has not produced clarity of principle. The prevailing stalemate is that the WTO Panels and Appellate Body assert authority to accept amicus curiae submissions, but as a practical matter have never meaningfully considered such submissions.
The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and Rwanda ("ICTR"), the Special Court for Sierra Leone ("SCSL") and the International Criminal Court ("ICC") are generally open to amicus curiae participation. 18 The ICTY and ICTR have identical rules in their Rules of Procedure and Evidence empowering them to "invite or grant leave to a state, organization or person to appear before it and make submissions". 19 This power has been used regularly by the ICTY and ICTR to appoint, and to accept requests to act as, amici curiae. 20 The SCSL has an almost identical provision, 21 which it has used to both seek and accept amicus curiae participation. 22 Finally, the ICC also has a provision which is "substantially similar" 23 to that of the ICTY and ICTR, 24 which it has also used a number of times. 25 Unlike in the ICJ and ITLOS, the admission of amici curiae in cases before the international criminal tribunals is thus clearly established.
Like the criminal tribunals, the European Court of Human Rights ("ECtHR") is permissive of amicus curiae participation. After admitting an amicus curiae for the first time in 1981, 26 the ECtHR's Rules of Procedure were amended explicitly to enable its President to invite or grant leave for amici curiae to make written submissions. 27 Subsequently, Protocol 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("ECHR") entered into force in 1994, amending the Convention to reflect this rule. Eventually, the ECtHR's Rules of Procedure were amplified, and a detailed procedure for the 212 Lucas Bastin admission of amici curiae was established. 28 This procedure has been used regularly. As one review notes, it served to allow amicus curiae participation in 35 cases between 1 November 1998 and 31 March 2005. 29 Although this represents a small proportion of the ECtHR's case-load, it nevertheless signifies probably the most active amicus curiae forum in international law.
Like many of the above fora, investor-state arbitral tribunals have recently witnessed increasing amicus curiae activity. Over the past decade, tribunals constituted pursuant to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), bilateral investment treaties ("BITs") and Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") have received numerous requests by NGOs, individuals, industry bodies and other entities to participate as amici curiae. The requests have varied in detail, but overall have sought leave to file written submissions, access case documents, attend hearings, make oral submissions, and/or respond to questions from the tribunal. The requests have met with limited success. The earliest request was rejected entirely, and subsequent requests struggled to gain much more than leave to file written submissions.
The poor reception which amici curiae initially received from tribunals prompted heavy criticism of investor-state arbitration. The New York Times labelled the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("IC-SID") tribunals as "Secret Trade Courts". 30 Commentators criticised the lack of transparency of, and civil society's access to, investor-state arbitrations.
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One NGO denied amicus curiae status lambasted the decision as "profoundly undemocratic", "inexcusable", a "closed-door process" and an "extreme example of excessive power granted to corporations". 32 Criticism prompted change. The system of investor-state arbitration started to grant more-but not unfettered-access to amici curiae. Engaging both with these developments and with the criticisms of the transparency of investor-state arbitration, commentary on the role of amici curiae increased. Most scholarship welcomed the arrival of amici curiae in investor-state arbitration, and identified ways in which their role could be expanded. Objections to expansion-chiefly the increase in costs and the lack of consent of the arbitrating parties-were usually put aside or dismissed. 33 Only a minority of contributions saw increased costs as a concern requiring positive regulation, such as the deposit by amici curiae of security for costs.
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In commentary which supports amicus curiae participation in investor-state arbitration, several contributions advocate a significant expansion of their role. One proposition is that the entire system of investor-state arbitration should be amended so that amici curiae would have a right of participation upon satisfaction of set criteria, notwithstanding that this would "require significant revision to the provisions of many prominent rules". 35 Another proposition is that investor-state tribunals be required, upon accepting an amicus curiae submission, to "take the submission seriously" because its acceptance "create[s] a legitimate expectation on the part of the amicus" that it will do so, with the result that tribunals must "as a minimum requirement ... summarize the arguments made in the submission and respond to them." 36 The position of this article is that these instances of previous scholarship define a role for amicus curiae which is impracticably extensive at this stage of the development of investor-state arbitration. This article advocates that the present goals of would-be amici curiae in investor-state arbitration should be 33 36 Ishikawa, supra note 33, at 410-1 (emphasis original). more limited than the "significant revision" of all major arbitral rules and less prescriptive than imposing "minimum requirements" on tribunals dealing with amici curiae. Rather, the development of the role of amici curiae in investor-state arbitration must be premised on their winning and deepening the familiarity and trust that states (which create and augment the system) and tribunals (which administer it) have with and in them. Reasonable and targeted demands, which do not entail dramatic overhaul of the investor-state arbitration system or unduly fetter tribunals, may then be advanced by amici curiae in a climate which is more receptive, and to an end which is more practicably attainable.
In advocating this position, this article provides a brief summary of both the investor-state arbitrations in which amici curiae have sought to participate to date, and the key issues which scholarship has identified vis-à-vis such participation. Having provided this summary, this article considers whether amici curiae are worthwhile in the investor-state arbitration system, what role they play in it and how commentary evaluates that role, and on what goals they might focus to increase their role. To assist its analysis, this article attaches as Appendix 1 a table summarising the amici curiae applications made in investor-state arbitrations to date, and the success which those applications have achieved.
The amicus curiae in investor-state arbitration: the cases and key issues in scholarship
Investor-state arbitrations in which amici curiae have sought to participate can be grouped into three categories, according to the combination of the consent to arbitrate and arbitral rules which are applicable in the arbitration. The categories are: arbitrations under BITs (or the Energy Charter Treaty) and the ICSID Arbitration Rules; arbitrations under NAFTA and the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL") Arbitration Rules; and arbitrations under some other combination of a consent to arbitrate and arbitral rules. This article summarises first the cases falling within each category, and secondly the key issues which scholarship has drawn from these cases. 
BIT/ICSID arbitrations
The BIT/ICSID category comprises eight cases. 38 The first case to receive an amicus curiae application was Aguas del Tunari, SA v Republic of Bolivia ("AdT v Bolivia"). In that case, the claimant won a concession to operate water services in Bolivia, but encountered opposition from local citizens. The claimant abandoned the project and commenced arbitration. Several NGOs and individuals sought to intervene either as parties or as amici curiae. In the latter capacity, they sought to: make written and oral submissions; receive disclosure of case materials; attend hearings; and respond to arguments concerning their application. The Tribunal rejected the requests entirely, concluding that they were "beyond the power or the authority of the Tribunal to grant" without the parties' agreement.
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The next BIT/ICSID case to receive an amicus curiae application was Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic ("Suez/Vivendi v Argentina"). The claimants commenced arbitration in respect of measures taken by Argentina during its economic crisis, which they said injured their investment procured through Argentina's privatisation of water services. Five NGOs sought leave to attend the hearings, make submissions and access case materials. The Tribunal held that the amici curiae could not attend the hearing as the parties to the arbitration had not so consented, 40 but that it was entitled to accept amicus curiae submissions under its general procedural power. 41 The Tribunal reasoned that acceptance of a submission should be based on: (i) the appropriateness of the subject matter of the case; (ii) the suitability of the non-party to act as amicus curiae; and (iii) the procedure to apply to the submission. 42 The Tribunal held that the NGOs should formally apply to make amici curiae submissions, at which point it would decide the matter. 43 The Tribunal found that the NGOs' subsequent application satisfied the criteria, allowed them to file a joint amici curiae submission, 44 but refused them access to case materials as they were already sufficiently well-informed. 45 The third BIT/ICSID case to encounter amici curiae was Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona SA, and InterAguas Servicios Integrales v Argentine Republic ("Suez/InterAguas v Argentina"). The case arose in similar circumstances to Suez/Vivendi, and the tribunal was identically constituted. Accordingly, when an NGO and three individuals requested leave as amici curiae to attend hearings, make written and oral submissions and have access to case materials, the tribunal unsurprisingly applied the three criteria from Suez/Vivendi. Unlike in Suez/Vivendi, however, the tribunal declined the request on the basis that the would-be amici curiae had not shown that their "experience, expertise and perspectives will assist the Tribunal", and had "not provided ... sufficient information and reasons to [show] that they qualify as amici curiae".
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Apparently in response to perceived inconsistencies between Suez/Vivendi v Argentina and Suez/InterAguas v Argentina 47 and criticisms relating to the lack of transparency of the investor-state arbitration system, 48 ICSID's Arbitration Rules were amended on 10 April 2006 to provide for limited participation of non-disputing parties. Arbitration Rule 37(2) was inserted, empowering tribunals to allow non-disputing parties to file written submissions "regarding a matter within the scope of the dispute". It also provides that, when deciding whether to allow such a filing, tribunals must consider (non-exhaustively) whether: (i) the submission would assist it in determining a factual or legal issue related to the proceedings by bringing a perspective or particular knowledge or insight different from that of the parties; (ii) the submission would address a matter within the scope of the dispute; and (iii) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the proceeding. Arbitration Rule 37(2) also requires the tribunal to ensure that the submission does not disrupt the proceeding 43 Ibid., at 12-3. 44 The Amicus Curiae in Investor-State Arbitration 217 or unduly burden or unfairly prejudice either party, and that the parties are able to comment on the submission. A second notable amendment concerned Arbitration Rule 32(2), which was reworded to allow the parties to veto the access of non-disputing parties to the hearing (absent which the tribunal would decide the matter).
The first BIT/ICSID arbitration which applied the amended ICSID Arbitration Rules was Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Ltd v United Republic of Tanzania ("Biwater Gauff v Tanzania"). The claimant commenced arbitration after Tanzania's cancellation of a water supply contract which it had concluded with the claimant two years earlier. Five NGOs sought: (i) status as amici curiae (and thus capacity to file written submissions); (ii) access to key documents; and (iii) permission to attend oral hearings and respond to questions of the tribunal. The Tribunal applied Arbitration Rule 37(2), and concluded that it "may benefit from a written submission" from the amici curiae, and thus allowed that request. 49 However, the tribunal rejected the requests to access documents, because the relevant information was already in the public domain, and to attend the hearing, because the claimant withheld its consent.
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The fifth and sixth examples in this category were a pair of arbitrations brought before ICSID pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty. The arbitrations concerned alleged breaches of applicable BITs resulting from Zimbabwe's conduct in relation to the forestry and timber processing industry. One NGO and four indigenous communities requested: (i) leave to file written submissions; (ii) access to key documents; and (iii) permission to attend the hearing and respond to questions posited by the tribunals. The identically constituted tribunals rejected all these requests. They held that the amici curiae failed to satisfy any paragraph of Rule 37(2). The potential submissions, which related to the interaction of international investment and human rights/indigenous law, would: be "unrelated to the matters" in dispute and thus would not assist "the determination of a factual or legal issue related to the proceedings"; concern "a matter outside the scope of the dispute, as it is presently constituted"; and not derive from a "significant interest in the proceeding". 54 More significantly, however, the tribunals held that it "is implicit in Rule 37(2)(a)" that an amicus curiae must be independent of the parties. 55 This requirement of "independence" was inferred from Rule 37(2), and supported by reference (only) to the Suez/InterAguas v Argentina decision (which predated the insertion of Rule 37(2) into the ICSID Rules). 56 Applying this condition of independence, the tribunals held that the "apparent lack of independence or 53 
NAFTA/UNCITRAL arbitrations
The second category of arbitrations in which amicus curiae participation has been sought is NAFTA/UNCITRAL arbitrations. This category comprises six cases. The first is Methanex Corporation v United states of America ("Methanex v US"). The dispute concerned a Californian ban of a certain gasoline additive, of an element of which the claimant was a producer. Three NGOs sought amici curiae participation in the form of, collectively: (i) making written submissions; (ii) receiving the parties' pleadings; (iii) attending the hearing; and (iv) making oral submissions at the hearing. The Tribunal noted its general power in Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 58 and granted the amici curiae leave to apply to file written submissions. 59 However, it rejected all other requests made by the amici curiae, noting that Article 25(4) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provided that hearings would be in camera, and that the parties had previously agreed that the arbitration would be confidential.
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A few months after this decision, the tribunal in United Parcel Service of America Inc v Canada ("UPS v Canada") considered a similar application. The claimant impugned Canadian measures which it said unfairly restricted access to the Canadian postal services market. A workers' Union and one NGO sought to be joined as parties or, failing that, to participate as amici curiae, requesting in that capacity: (i) the right to make submissions (presumably written and oral); and (ii) access to case materials. The Tribunal invoked Article 15(1) of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in order to allow the amici curiae to file written submissions, 61 but relied on Article 25(4) to refuse them access to the oral hearing. 62 The Tribunal also refused access to the case materials, indicating that this was a matter for the parties to agree. 63 Ibid., para. 68. The parties ultimately agreed to publicise pleadings and other materials, a decision generally followed in NAFTA arbitrations since.
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Perhaps sensing the beginning of a trend, the NAFTA states parties addressed the role of amici curiae in the NAFTA Free Trade Commission ("FTC"). In a 2003 statement, the FTC confirmed that amici curiae could apply for leave to submit written submissions in NAFTA arbitrations. The FTC statement then set guidelines regarding such submissions. Key guidelines were that tribunals, when deciding whether to grant leave to file a submission, should consider whether: (i) the submission would assist it in determining a factual or legal issue by bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight different from the parties'; (ii) the submission would address matters within the scope of the dispute; (iii) the would-be amicus curiae has a significant interest in the arbitration; and (iv) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration. The FTC Statement also requires the tribunal to ensure that the submission will not disrupt the arbitration, and that neither party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by the submission. 64 Although these guidelines in the FTC statement are "recommendations", NAFTA tribunals have in practice followed them closely.
The
next NAFTA/UNCITRAL arbitration to receive an amicus curiae application was Glamis Gold Ltd v United states of America ("Glamis Gold v US").
The claimant complained that regulations implemented by California requiring metal mining companies to backfill open-pit mines and take steps to return the land to usable conditions and preserve Native American sites breached the NAFTA. Several NGOs applied to act as amici curiae, as did the National Mining Association, a mining industry representative body, and the Quechan Indian Nation, the indigenous population whose land rights could be directly affected. The applications sought permission only to file written submissions, and most referred explicitly to the FTC statement when framing their applications. The Tribunal, invoking the FTC Statement and observing that "leave to file and acceptance of submissions should be granted liberally", granted the requests of the amici curiae. The fifth instance of amicus curiae participation in this category is slightly unusual. In Grand River Enterprises Six Nations Ltd et al v United states of America ("Grand River v US"), in which the claimants alleged that actions taken by the United States to settle litigation against domestic cigarette manufacturers breached the NAFTA, the tribunal received an unsolicited letter from the National Chief of the Assembly of First Nations. While the letter expressed support for the claimant, it did not request leave to make further submissions or for any action to be taken to formalise the status of the National Chief in the arbitration. Despite noting that the letter should be dealt with according to the FTC statement, 67 the tribunal ultimately did not decide the issue. Rather, the claimants "included the National Chief's letter as a supporting exhibit ... [and] in that context, it was read and considered by the Tribunal."
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The final NAFTA/UNCITRAL arbitration in which amicus curiae participation has been sought is Apotex Inc v United states of America ("Apotex v US"). The arbitration concerned decisions by United states courts which allegedly impaired the access of the claimant to the United states market for antidepressant drugs. The only amicus curiae that sought to participate was the Study Center for Sustainable Finance, the research and development arm of an Italian management consulting firm. It sought to file written submissions. The tribunal refused this request on the basis that the application had not satisfied the guidelines in the FTC statement. In particular, the application had "not pointed to any knowledge, experience or expertise" which the would-be amicus curiae would bring to the arbitration, had "not defined any significant interest in this arbitration", and had "failed to explain the particular public interest it would be seeking to address". 
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Lucas Bastin arbitrate and arbitral rules (that is, non-BIT/ICSID and non-NAFTA/UNCI-TRAL arbitrations). This category comprises three cases. The first is Eureko BV v Solvak Republic "Eureko v Slovak Republic"). This arbitration was initiated under the Dutch-Slovak BIT and conducted pursuant to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the course of considering its jurisdiction to hear the dispute, the tribunal, with the parties' agreement, invited two entities to submit written amici curiae submissions. 70 The first was the Netherlands, in its capacity as the other state party to the BIT, and the second was the EU Commission, in its capacity as an organ with oversight of EU law (which was relevant due to the intra-EU nature of the BIT). The Tribunal did not invite the amici curiae, nor did they seek, to participate in any other way. The Tribunal did not explain the legal basis on which it requested, or then accepted, the submissions. Presumably the agreement of the parties was deemed sufficient. Thus the submissions were accepted and considered in detail by the tribunal.
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The second instance of amicus curiae participation in this category occurred in PacRim Cayman LLC v Republic of El Salvador ("PacRim v El Salvador"). The claimant asserted that regulatory measures taken by El Salvador prevented it from developing gold mining rights in breach of the investment protections in the Central America-United states-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement ("CAFTA-DR"). The arbitration proceeded under the ICSID Arbitration Rules. A coalition of NGOs sought permission to participate jointly as amici curiae, seeking leave to file written submissions, and to attend and make oral submissions at the hearing on jurisdiction. Relying on provisions in both the CAFTA-DR and the ICSID Arbitration Rules, the tribunal granted leave for the NGOs to submit a joint written submission but refused them permission to appear and make oral submissions at the hearing.
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The final arbitration in this category is Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v Republic of Ecuador ("Chevron v Ecuador"). This arbitration was commenced pursuant to a BIT and conducted under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. It concerned allegations that domestic proceedings pursued in Ecuadorian courts in relation to remedial measures taken by the claimants after their exit from an oil concession consortium violated the Ecuador-United states BIT. Two NGOs jointly sought permission as amici curiae to: (i) file a written submission; (ii) attend the hearing and either present oral submissions 70 
Key issues in scholarship on the amicus curiae in investor-state arbitration
Because the commentary regarding amici curiae in investor-state arbitration has centred on whether they should play a role in the system, or if they do play a role whether it should be expanded, the key issues in scholarship read somewhat like a balance sheet. Most of the discussion has focused on identifying and evaluating the problems associated with not allowing amici curiae a role, or an expanded role, in investor-state arbitration, or conversely the problems associated with granting them that role. This article now summarises the scholarship on each side of this ledger. Numerous contributions have emphasised the problems with withholding from amici curiae initially a role, and more lately an expanded role, in the system of investor-state arbitration. These problems can be grouped into two main categories.
The first category is that the transparency, legitimacy and accountability of the system of investor-state arbitration, as it is perceived from without, suffers. Virtually all scholarship which favours amici curiae in investor-state arbitrations stresses this point. The argument has various strands. Some authors emphasise procedural transparency, arguing that participation of amici curiae "promote[s] a general interest in procedural openness and ensure[s] that the broader public does not perceive the arbitration process as`secretive' , ". 74 Other authors highlight the need for tribunals to be well-informed, maintaining that amici curiae "address certain factors the parties are unable or unwilling to address", "supply the tribunals with more comprehensive legal arguments ... [and] an extra layer of factual information", and "inform the tribunal of the broader implications of a decision". 75 Still others focus on the public interest, noting that decisions which "may require a change in the law and practice of the state party and [require] the public ... to pay for any liability imposed on a State" necessitate greater transparency than, say, private commercial arbitration.
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The most robust proponents of transparency assert that amici curiae help rescue a system which places its "legitimacy in peril", 77 contributes to "the democratic deficit" 78 and can constitute "an assault on the ability of governments to regulate investment". 79 The more involved that amici curiae are, so the argument goes, the more transparent, legitimate and accountable investor-state arbitration becomes.
The second category of problems arising from the marginalisation of amici curiae is that their absence means investor-state arbitral tribunals, as they operate from within, cannot competently undertake their mandate. Because the "investor-state arbitration process allows investors to bypass domestic courts and challenge democratically enacted legislation through a private process", the admission of amici curiae helps "provide information and raise public policy issues that are necessary to properly decide the dispute."
80 As investor-state arbitrations consider a wide variety of regulatory measures, an understanding of the public impact of the implementation of the measure, and its potential modification, is fundamental to the fulfilment of a tribunal's task appropriately to "review and discipline legislators, judges and other public officials". 81 Facilitating that understanding may not always be in the parties' interests, 82 and perhaps especially not that of the investor, 83 making it crucial for amici curiae to be heard when the impugned "regulation ... goes to the core 76 82 Ishikawa, supra note 33, at 402-3. 83 Viñuales, supra note 3, at 75. the dispute. "The provision of a neutral forum for the resolution of investment disputes is one of the achievements of the international investment dispute resolution system." 91 By granting non-parties access to an arbitration, the risk is that political or ideological views may be introduced, contrary to the parties' wishes, into what was intended as an apolitical environment. One author maintains that admission of amici curiae may push tribunals towards "courts of public opinion", and that in any event resolution "of disputes in conditions of complete publicity does not lend itself to principled outcomes". 92 To these concerns about the involvement of amici curiae a fourth concern can now be added. Brought to the fore by the recent decision in von Pezold/Border v Zimbabwe, it is the fear that entities that are not independent of the parties to the dispute will seek to influence, and create an imbalance in, the arbitration through participation as amici curiae. Although little has yet been written about the significance of this development, 93 one may expect considerable discussion of the concerns surrounding "non-independence" of amici curiae to emerge in due course.
argues that tribunals should be required to "take the submission seriously", and when fulfilling this duty must "as a minimum ... summarize the arguments made in the submission and respond to them ... [and] explain the reasons for agreeing or disagreeing with them." 107 In a similar vein, another author envisages "significant revision" to "many prominent rules" so that "a harmonized approach to third-party participation" can be developed which will, upon satisfaction of uniform criteria, allow a "guaranteed or mandatory, rather than purely discretionary, right of participation".
108
These calls for reform are, in the view of this article, impracticable and unhelpful. To overhaul the system of investor-state arbitration to introduce uniform minimum requirements for either the admission of amici curiae, or the treatment of their submissions once admitted, would be an enormous task. It would certainly require amendment of all major arbitral rules, and possibly also renegotiation of multilateral treaties such as the ICSID Convention. Even then, ad hoc arbitrations may still occur pursuant to instruments containing certain types of arbitration clauses, meaning that harmonisation could only fully occur upon the review and amendment of all such instruments (covering both treaties, such as BITs and FTAs, and international investment agreements, such as concession contracts). This would be a process far more complex than the amendment of the ECtHR's Rules of Procedure and the addition of Protocol 11 to the ECHR, which was the only previous successful example of an international tribunal recalibrating its constitutive instruments to allow greater access to amici curiae. More than simply impractical, however, the endeavour would likely be contrary to the desire of states, the ultimate creators and amenders of the system. states' desire for gradual rather than grand change is evidenced by the piecemeal fashion in which they have augmented the system to date. A (small) number of states have granted amici curiae limited participation rights under model BITs, entered into BITs and FTAs which do likewise, and established guidelines for participation under certain multilateral trade and investment agreements. 109 Equally gradual were the amendments to the ICSID Arbitration Rules and the changes effected by the FTC statement. Rather than granting amici curiae all participation rights they had previously sought, the new Arbitration Rules only introduced a tribunal discretion to allow the filing of written submissions upon satisfaction of set criteria, while the FTC statement largely reiterated the principles articulated in Methanex v US and UPS v Canada.
As evidenced in other international fora, such as the WTO, states can be hesitant about increasing the participation of amici curiae. The expansion of the amicus curiae role is thus a matter more likely to be achieved by degrees. Advocates for amicus curiae participation who seek holistic reform of the investor-state arbitration system may thus, by their overreaching, hinder efforts by amici curiae to expand their role in the system incrementally. states will not be reticent to object if they feel the role of the amicus curiae is expanding too quickly or beyond their control. That, surely, is the lesson of states' reaction to the US-Shrimp decision of the WTO Appellate Body. By pushing for too much, too soon, proponents of an expansive and harmonised role for amici curiae in investor-state arbitration may alienate states, retard the gradual process of reform witnessed in recent years and make it harder for tribunals to lend a sympathetic ear to the submissions of amici curiae.
It is the position of this article that any development of the role of amici curiae in the system of investor-state arbitration will most readily be achieved through their efforts to win and deepen the familiarity and trust that states and tribunals have with and in them. By making reasonable and targeted demands, which seek to augment by gradations the current structure of the system and not to overhaul it holistically, amici curiae will be more likely to achieve institutional reform granting them greater access. To this end, amici curiae would be better served focusing on goals which are more easily attainable, and to which they might reasonably expect states and tribunals to agree. The promulgation of the FTC statement and the introduction of ICSID Arbitration Rule 37(2) are good examples of how erstwhile aspirations for amicus curiae participation have now been realised, even if they represent only the first of several steps towards greater participation. That gradual improvement of amicus curiae access is the model to follow.
In pursuing this more attainable expansion of their role, amici curiae might reasonably, at the present stage of development of the investor-state arbitration system, seek to achieve three goals. The first goal is to become a more familiar part of the system. Would-be amici curiae could achieve this by taking every appropriate opportunity to participate. This involves not simply ensuring that all appropriate arbitrations attract the attention and application to participate of relevant amici curiae. It also entails amici curiae engaging, when appropriate, in repeat interventions. Although there are examples of amici curiae participating in multiple arbitrations, 110 repeat participation is far
